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Abstract 
Various strands of literature on civic engagement, ‘big data’ and open government view  
digital technologies as the key to easier government accountability and citizens’ 
empow erment, and the solution to many of the problems of contemporary democracies. 
Draw ing on a critical analysis of contemporary Mexican social and political phenomena, and 
on a tw o-year-long ethnography w ith the #YoSoy132 netw orked movement, this article 
demonstrates that digital tools have been successfully deployed by Mexican parties and 
governments in order to manufacture consent, sabotage dissidence, threaten activists, and 
gather personal data w ithout citizens’ agreement. These new  algorithmic strategies, it is 
contended, clearly show  that there is nothing inherently democratic in digital communication 
technologies, and that citizens and activists have to struggle against increasingly 
sophisticated techniques of control and repression that exploit the very mechanisms that 
many consider to be emancipatory technologies.  
Introduction: coming to terms with techno-optimism within digital democratic 
participation 
There is a shared tendency in different strands of the literature on civic engagement, digital 
activism and protest movements – as w ell as in reflections on the possibilities afforded by 
open/‘big’ data for increasing democratic participation – to view  digital technology as the key 
to easier government accountability, and the panacea that can easily solve the various 
issues that plague the w orn apparatus of contemporary public institutions. For instance, in 
recent years the literature on social movements and digital media technologies has often 
reduced diverse complex socio-technical configurations and cultural contexts to simple, 
easy-to-understand Tw itter or Facebook ‘revolutions’. At the same time, the technological 
developments enabling the publication of Open Data and the tools and capacities to engage 
w ith it have been at the forefront of techno-optimism in the transparency and accountability 
field. These developments hold the potential for making vast amounts of government data – 
including budget and procurement information – w idely available to huge numbers of 
citizens, w ho, as the hypothesis goes, w ill then be able to easily analyse and use the data to 
hold governments to account. How ever, various authors have started to unravel the 
ambiguities, promises and perils of the open government phenomenon (Davies and Baw a 
2012; Yu and Robinson 2012).  
 
Meanw hile, the ‘big data’ phenomenon has gained remarkable momentum across a w ide 
range of industries and fields, as w ell as academia. Like many ‘buzzw ords’ that have entered 
the contemporary debate, ‘big data’ refers to a plethora of interconnected social, economical 
and technological phenomena, w ith reflections about the benefits and challenges of 
analysing “massive quantities of information produced by and about people, things and their 
interactions” (Boyd and Craw ford 2012:1) at their centre. The potential of large-scale data- 
gathering has been praised for its unprecedented revolutionary possibilities, w hich could 
include a decisive improvement in the w ays citizens and governments interact.  
 
Diverse voices have begun to question uncritical view s of these phenomena, for example 
providing more nuanced reflections on the pitfalls and threats of ‘big data’ (Boyd and 
Craw ford 2012; Couldry and Pow ell 2014; Craw ford, Gray and Miltner 2014; Tufecki 2014). 
These authors contend that ‘big data’ is not merely a technological issue, but first and 
foremost a ‘mythology’ (Mosco 2014), an emerging w orldview  that has to be interrogated, 
and critically engaged w ith, not incontrovertibly accepted and applauded. Thus, 
understanding ‘big data’ means exploring the consequences of the computational turn 
across multiple disciplines, and through the alterations it creates in the spheres of 
epistemology, ontology and ethics. It also means examining the limitations, errors and 
biases in the gathering and interpretation of these massive quantities of information, as w ell 
as access to it. In sum, it means untangling the processes at the core of our ‘algorithmic 
culture’ (Hallinan and Striphas 2015).  
 
Other critical voices that tackle the limits, risks and threats of digital communication 
technologies in relation to democratic processes have emerged (Fuchs 2014; Dean 2005). 
Even so, most accounts of experiences and case studies related to the use and 
appropriation of digital technology in relation to civic engagement still put much emphasis on 
the use of online platforms to simply ‘fix’ feedback loops, allow ing citizens to provide 
feedback on public services, and the predominant mood remains optimistic about the 
potential opportunities that technology can offer for citizens to hold governments to account. 
One of the key lessons of the Making All Voices Count programme i is precisely that the 
issue of accountability should be framed as a complex political problem, rather than an 
technical one. But, as has been show n in recent studies (Morozov 2013; Treré and 
Barranquero 2013), accountability has often been seen as a matter of simply ‘finding the 
right technological problem-solving tool’. Furthermore, the controversial question of obtaining 
government responsiveness has been usually treated in technology studies as a linear and 
straightforw ard procedure (McGee 2014), rather than as a process that entails dealing 
strategically w ith pow er relations that influence w hich voices w ill be heard, thus constituting 
a delicate dance betw een mechanisms that promote citizens’ voice and efforts to change 
government behaviours. How ever, the voice of citizens does not speak in a vacuum, but 
rather w ithin the boundaries and the limitations of contemporary neoliberalism, that 
systematically denies and undermines it (Couldry 2010).  
 
Much of the current focus neglects the w ays in w hich governments can and do use digital 
technology to survey and undermine citizens’ attempts to hold them accountable. Instead, 
something that the recent National Security Agency–Snow den scandal made clear is that 
these technologies are used more to spy on us and limit our freedom, than to provide us w ith 
useful tools to improve the functioning of democratic institutions.  
 
This article w ill try to counteract the techno-optimistic bias by providing and examining some 
examples that clearly illustrate the various complications emerging from the deployment of  
digital technologies by governments and parties, and appropriations by citizens and activists. 
The article w ill draw  on a critical analysis of various contemporary Mexican social and 
political phenomena, and on a tw o-year-long multimodal ethnography that relies on the 
triangulation of different methodologies: fifty individual interview s w ith activists of 
#YoSoy132; four group interview s w ith protesters from Mexico City, Guadalajara and 
Querétaro; several short periods of participant observation during 2012 and 2013; and a 
qualitative content analysis of digital media and online platforms. Based on the exploration of 
the Mexican resistance scenario, this article w ill clearly show  that digital platforms can be 
used by government and parties in order to create consent online, control and monitor 
citizens’ activities, and undermine dissent on social media platforms. It also show s that the 
appropriation of digital communication technologies by activists, far for being a linear and 
unproblematic practice, is instead afflicted by everyday frictions, conflicts and struggles.  
 
The article begins by describing the context of the 2012 Mexican elections and the ectivism 
phenomenon. It goes on to explore the algorithmic manufacturing of consent and 
undermining of dissent, focusing on the emergence of the #YoSoy132 movement and the 
perils of its digital media practices, in particular the so-called ‘Cossío case’. Finally, it 
outlines some broader considerations for the study of digital politics and sketches future 
scenarios.  
 
The 2012 Mexican elections  
During the run-up to the 2012 Mexican general elections, the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party (PRI) – w hich governed for 70 years, prior to the election of the National Action Party 
(PAN) in 2000 – led in several polls. The PRI candidate w as a young and attractive man, 
w hose image dominated the media: Enrique Peña Nieto (EPN). As documented by various 
investigative journalists (Tuckman 2012; Villamil 2010), for six years the Mexican media titan 
Televisa had crafted EPN’s candidacy, at the same time as delegitimising his left-w ing 
opponent Manuel López Obrador. The Mexican telecracy – the media television duopoly 
Televisa-TvAzteca, w hich controls 99% of the market (Huerta-Wong and Gómez 2013) – 
has been described as a ‘w ild pow er’ (Trejo 2004), capable of a pow erful impact on political 
decisions. Before 2012, Mexican politicians had never considered politics through digital 
technologies a priority, relying instead on the pow erful media propaganda apparatus 
provided by television as their main channel for campaigning (SánchezEspino 2012).   
 
The ectivism phenomenon 
The 2012 elections w itnessed w hat some saw  as an explosion of digital politics, w ith 
politicians embracing social media to spread their messages and to engage in dialogue w ith 
citizens. But they mostly considered online spaces as sites for both the premeditated 
construction of consensus and the artificial, algorithmic construction of consent, rather than 
environments for reinforcing democracy through dialogue, participation and transparency.  
 
Octavio Islas has framed this behaviour as “authoritarian engineering” (Islas 2015:1), the 
adoption by Mexican politicians of dirty online strategies w hich reveal their incapacity and 
refusal to develop political campaigns that can build a trustw orthy base of sympathisers and 
follow ers in cyberspace, and the very opposite of citizen participation. A video posted on 
YouTube the day before the second presidential debate, The Truth of Peña Nieto on 
Twitter, i i revealed the existence of organised groups of so-called PRI ectivistas (‘ectivists’), 
dedicated to tw eeting according to the  instructions of EPN’s campaign leaders, and trying to 
counteract, isolate or sabotage criticisms of PRI from civil society actors or other citizens. 
The film show s a campaign operator telling ectivists how  to overturn hashtags negative to 
the campaign. 
 
The ectivist phenomenon is controversial. The netw ork w as formed in December 2009, and 
ectivist leaders have alw ays claimed to be nothing more than a netw ork of independent 
young volunteers and PRI supporters i i i. But, as the online video show s, and as other 
researchers have demonstrated (Figueiras 2012), the organisation of an estimated 100,000 
ectivists (Islas 2015) w as used systematically during the PRI campaign to successfully 
spread and situate Peña Nieto’s image on digital media platforms. In particular, the netw ork 
w as ‘activated’ during periods w hen Peña Nieto’s public image suffered, for instance after 
his speech at the Guadalajara International Book Fair, w hen he w as unable to accurately 
name three books that had influenced his life, and w hen the #YoSoy132 movement 
emerged. In order to counteract embarrassments and negative public image, Peña Nieto’s 
media team intensified the directed online activities of the ectivists. Although one of Peña 
Nieto’s campaign managers (w ho later became Secretary of Education) acknow ledged i v in 
May 2012 that 20,000 ectivists w ere tw eeting w ithout receiving any monetary compensation, 
many thousands of others w ere hired, revealing the possibilities for impacting, distorting and 
manufacturing public opinion w ithin digital environments that institutional parties w ith 
immense financial resources like the PRI have at their disposal.  
 
The algorithmic manufacturing of consent  
The use of digital strategies in Mexican electoral politics dates to the 2011 elections for the 
Governor of the State of Mexico, but the 2012 general election saw  them refined and 
broadened. Studies of the social media strategies of Mexican politicians during the 2012 
campaign find that intensified use of digital technologies did not correspond to an increase in 
democratic participation or dialogue betw een candidates and voters, but w as instead 
constituted by a massive deployment of strategies including: the creation of false universes 
of follow ers; the use of softw are robots (bots)v to automatically generate tw eets; and the 
hiring of trolls (people w ho tw eet in favour of a candidate, and against their opponent); and 
ghost follow ers (empty accounts that boost a candidate’s follow ers). By employing these 
strategies, candidates discarded the possibility of using digital technologies to include of 
voters’ feedback into their decisions, or incorporate democratic visions into their w ays of 
doing politics (Ricaurte Quijano 2013). An article on the phenomenon in the MIT Technology 
Review  (Orcutt 2012) discusses dangers of “large-scale political spamming”, and the need to 
develop countermeasures to prevent the expansion of this phenomenon to other political 
scenarios.  
 
The algorithmic undermining of dissent  
The algorithmic construction of consent goes hand-in-hand w ith the undermining of critical 
voices. As carefully documented by several bloggers vi, EPN critics mobilising for the 
#MarchaAntiEPN (March against Peña Nieto) on Tw itter w ere systematically attacked and 
blocked online. As Verkamp and Gupta (2013) demonstrate, dissident voices w ere ‘drow ned’ 
on various occasions by orchestrated bot attacks. Since 2012, political activists and civil 
society organisations have denounced the dangers of these attacks, arguing that they 
criminalise protest and segregate dissident voices vi i, pointing out the need to act immediately 
to prevent more serious future threats. Unfortunately, political strategies that rely on digital 
technologies to artificially boost consensus have been enhanced in the years since the 
election, up to the point w here they have become an essential component of the 
government’s modus operandi, used repeatedly during 2013.vi i i  
 
One case is particularly illuminating, described by philosopher Carlos Soto Morfín as a clear 
example of techno-authoritarianismi x. A study, commissioned by the new s programme of a 
liberal Mexican journalist and carried out by social netw ork and data-mining agency Mesura, 
exposed the massive use of bots to build an illusion of online support for a controversial 
energy reform (Aristegui Noticias 2015). Mesura documented the systematic deployment of 
bots to tw eet and re-tw eet in support of the reform, discovering that the time gap betw een 
the sending of a supportive original message and its re-tw eeting w as too short to be 
accomplished by a human being. Morfín, one of the authors of the study, concludes by 
w arning about the risks to w hich citizens are exposed in an era w hen the importance of 
digital politics is grow ing day by day, and w hen those in pow er have no ethical problems w ith 
manipulating public perception.  
 
On 26 September 2014, a group of students departed the Ayotzinapa Rural Teachers’ 
College for a protest in the city of Iguala, about 130km aw ay. They never arrived. Exactly 
w hat happened remains unknow n, but w e do know  that at least three students w ere killed 
and another 43 remain missing. The Mexican government’s official version is that the 
students w ere killed after being handed over to the Guerreros Unidos cartel on the orders of 
the mayor of Iguala, but investigations conducted by the Mexican critical magazine Proceso 
and the US publication The Intercept portrayed a darker picture of government complacency. 
After the event, several activists and citizens started to protest on social media, and the 
Tw itter hashtag #YaMeCanse (I am tired) – w hich expressed the feeling of not being able to 
take any more violence or permanent insecurity – soon became the core for mobilising and 
spreading information. But journalist Erin Gallagher, w ho covers protests for the online 
magazine Revolution News x soon noticed something atypical in the search results for the 
#YaMeCanse hashtags: that they w ere flooded w ith tw eets including the hashtag but no 
other content apart from random punctuation marks. The accounts that w ere tw eeting this 
kind of empty content w ere bots: they lacked follow ers, and w ere tw eeting automatically. The 
noise they created made it difficult for citizens to share information using #YaMeCanse, and 
the hashtag consequently dropped out of Tw itter’s trending topics. Mexican blogger and 
data-mining analyst Alberto Escorcia has discovered a reliable w ay of detecting bot accounts 
by examining the number of connections a Tw itter account has w ith other users, and has 
been documenting the use of bots in Mexico to sabotage protests by preventing information 
from spreading, and to send death threats to specific activists. For example, since February 
2015, anthropologist, activist and blogger Rossana Reguillo has received regular death 
threats on various social media platforms xi. Particularly harsh attacks via Tw itter lasted more 
than tw o months, and data-mining analysis of the Tw itter campaign show ed that bots and 
trolls w ere responsible for the majority of the attacks. 
 
Another social media is possible? The #YoSoy132 movement 
In the run-up to the 2012 elections, EPN’s path to the presidency seemed unstoppable. But 
on 11 May, something unsettled his image as the only available option for Mexico. He 
arrived at the private, religious IberoAmerican University in Mexico City to give a lecture, an 
event that PRI expected to run in an uncomplicated w ay. How ever, during the candidate’s 
presentation, several students began to question him about police repression and the killings 
that occurred w hen he w as Governor of the State of Mexico. When EPN justified those 
violent repressions, tensions rose, and he had to leave the university surrounded by a 
security cordon. Immediately after the event, PRI politicians described the students as 
violent, intolerant fascist thugs, going so far as to deny that they w ere students. At the same 
time, the Mexican telecracy and the new spaper chain Organización Editorial Mexicana 
presented versions of the event w hich portrayed EPN as a hero w ho had survived a boycott 
organized by the Left. This biased coverage led 131 IberoAmerican students to publish a 
video on YouTubexi i in w hich they displayed their student credentials and read their out their 
names to the camera. This pow erful act of reclaimed identity marked the start of the 
#YoSoy132 movement, w hen the phrase ‘131 students from Ibero’ quickly became one of 
the trending topics on Tw itter in Mexico, and other students began to join the protest, stating 
‘I am 132’. This led to the creation of the hashtag w hichhashtag that w ent on to identify the 
w hole movement. While the dirty digital strategies of institutional politics w ere dominating 
cyberspace, these students proved to the w orld that digital technologies could be used also 
to spread critical voices, mobilise support, organise protests and foster collective 
identification processes. 
 
The digital perils of a networked movement  
The celebratory literature that has developed around the #YoSoy132 movement proclaims 
the role of social media in the development of a ‘fifth state’ and in the birth of a ‘Mexican 
spring’ (Islas and Arribas 2012), and frames digital technologies as a pow erful media 
alternative to the Mexican telecracy (Andión Gamboa 2013). My research depicts a different 
scenario, w here everyday frictions and struggles, issues of exploitation, dataveillance and 
control – together w ith constant attempts at delegitimisation – continuously plague 
protestors’ use of digital technologies. Activists’ social media communications are constantly 
afflicted by clashes, struggles and discord. These divergences come to manifest themselves 
in terms of daily interactions as concern and discomfort w ith integrating social media into 
protest practices. Issues of ephemerality and w eak ties seep through movement interactions 
by raising questions of authority and belonging, played out in terms of conflicts over w ho has 
access to digital media, and w hat can be posted on social media platforms in the name of 
any given protest. These are illustrated by the Cossío case, in w hich a w eb platform w as 
used to infiltrate the movement, gather data on activists and post tw o videos to try to 
undermine the reputation of #YoSoy132.  
 
The Cossío case: web surveillance and video aggressions 
In May 2012, a man named Manuel Cossío offered #YoSoy132 activists his digital expertise 
and a fully functional w eb portal, YoSoy132.mx. Only ten days after the emergence of 
#YoSoy132, Cossío entered the movement through one of its most prominent student 
activists, Saúl Alvídrez. While Alvídrez and other activists had already acquired the 
YoSoy132.com and the YoSoy132.com.mx domains, it w as the YoSoy132.mx registered by 
Cossío that w as finally adopted, thanks to Cossío’s rhetorical skills in selling the movement 
his “valuable, ready-to-go product”xi i i during various assemblies and meetings. Announced 
as the official page of the movement by various activists on their Tw itter feeds and Facebook 
pages, this professional-looking w ebsite, fully integrated w ith possibilities for access and 
interactions w ith other platforms like Google and Facebook, w as extensively adopted for 
debate, organisation, content spreading, and especially for the archiving of contributors’ 
data. But, after a month of intense use of the w ebsite, something strange occurred. On 18 
June, tw o YouTube videos appeared on the home page of the #YoSoy132 portal and in the 
YouTube account ‘Yo Soy’xiv.  
 
In the first video, w e see in the background the fixed image of  the face of Saúl Alvídrez, at 
the same time as w e hear his voice and see yellow  subtitles that report his w ords. The 
audio, clearly recorded w ithout his consent, appears as a combination of various of Alvídrez’ 
informal talks, in w hich #YoSoy132 student speaks about the movement and relations w ith 
Andrés Manuel Lopez Obrador (the leader of the Left), and other leftist figures, especially a 
collective of directors, investigative journalists and other critical intellectuals named México, 
ahora o nunca (Mexico, now  or never).  
 
The second video is entitled La verdad nos hará libres (Truth w ill set us free) – a biblical 
quote, the motto of the IberoAmerican University, w hich w as adopted as one of the principal 
slogans of the movement. Manuel Cossío speaks to the camera, reading a text w here he 
expresses his profound disappointment on discovering that many leaders of the #YoSoy132 
movement had been co-opted by left-w ing politicians affiliated w ith the Party of the 
Democratic Revolution party, such as Marcelo Ebrard, López Obrador and Alejandro 
Encinas.  
 
Both of these online attempts at delegitimisationdelegitimatisation w ere the creation of 
Manuel Cossío Ramos, ow ner and manager of the YoSoy132.mx w ebsite. According to an 
inquiry carried out by the online investigative journalism w ebsite Contralínea in June 2013xv, 
Cossío w as an agent of  the Mexican Secret Service, the Centre of National Watch and 
Security, w hose mission w as to infiltrate the movement, steal data through the use of the 
Web platform, and destabilise the pow er balances w ithin #YoSoy132 before the elections. 
Activists of the movement, flooded w ith activities, internal struggles and frictions, and having 
to deal w ith organisational challenges in the immediate days after the eruption of  
#YoSoy132, trusted Cossío and fell into the government’s ‘digital trap’.  
 
The tw o videos caused controversy and conflict: Alvídrez had to leave the movement and 
the Mexican telecracy took advantage of the event to insinuate that the videos represented a 
clear proof that the Mexican movement had been manipulated from the beginning by the 
intellectuals of the Left. #YoSoy132 activists eventually realized that the platform w as 
intended as a w ay to monitor, control and profile them and decided to migrate to another 
platform, yosoy132media.mx. This migration and the dangers related to the use of the other 
so-called ‘apocryphal w eb pages’ w ere officially announced on Facebook and spread 
through multiple Tw itter accounts in order to inform citizens about the real intentions of 
Cossío and the nature of  the fake portal; other users and supporters from the Mexican 
blogosphere also retw eeted the information.  
 
According to the Contralínea w ebsite, the platform w as able to steal the information of more 
than seventy thousand citizens w ith yet unexplored consequences for the Mexican 
resistance. But w e still do not have clear figures and data on the scope and the results of 
this operation of sabotage and surveillance by the Mexican government, and w e almost 
surely never w ill. The mechanisms of this kind of digital w arfare remain opaque, secret and 
very difficult to decode. What this example clearly show s is the extent to w hich political 
control can use the technological platform through w hich opposition is carried out, stealing 
data and monitoring protest activities, controlling the information flow ing through the 
platform, and exploiting it to compromise and destabilise the reputation of the movement. 
The same digital communication technologies that allow  engaged citizens to organise, 
spread alternative information, and make the government accountable have been easily 
infiltrated and used against them.  
 
Conclusions: the limits and future horizons of data activism 
In contrast to celebratory accounts that in various disciplines and fields have conceived the 
increasing use of digital technologies as a w ay to make governments accountable, and solve 
most of the issues that plague contemporary political systems, this article, based on an 
exploration of social and political experiences of the Mexican context, has demonstrated that 
digital tools have been successfully deployed by parties and governments to manufacture 
consent, sabotage dissidence, threaten activists, and gather information w ithout citizens’ 
consent.  
 
Now adays, institutions and parties cannot only count on the traditional channels of 
propaganda, such as the pow erful and biased mainstream media apparatus, but can also 
use their vast financial resources in order to hire crow ds of sympathisers that can boost their 
image on digital platforms, deploy armies of bots and trolls that can be activated to sabotage 
dissent and hinder critical voices on social media, and infiltrate movements w ith imposter 
techies w ho can use w ebsites to steal sensible activists’ data.  
 
Against these pow erful strategies, activists have few digital w eapons at their disposal, above 
all because they cannot count on huge economic resources. How ever, as w e have seen 
throughout the article, some of them have started to use their technological skills in social 
netw ork analysis and data-mining techniques in order to unmask and denounce these dirty 
strategies on various radical media outlets. Perhaps w e can conceive of these tactics as 
‘counterprotocol practices’ (Gallow ay and Thacker 2007) that use the same advanced 
technological tools that the pow erful deploy to control us in order to make their strategies 
visible and accountable. This form of ‘data activism’ (Milan 2015) can empow er citizens and 
activists in their quest for truth and accountability, but given the unbalanced distribution of 
pow er, these attempts remain feeble and seldom influence public opinion at the international 
level, or the effective counteraction of such dirty schemes.  
Before singing the praises of digital communication technologies to make democratic 
institutions more accountable and reliable, w e should recognise, understand and try to 
overcome the plethora of dangers and risks that are associated w ith them in the arena of 
digital politics. The algorithmic construction of consent and the artificial sabotage of dissent 
demonstrate that there is nothing inherently democratic in digital technologies. In order to 
guarantee that a plurality of critical voices is represented and can be heard, citizens have to 
struggle against increasingly sophisticated techniques of control and repression that 
successfully exploit the very mechanisms that many consider to be emancipatory 
technologies.  
 
References 
Aristegui Noticias (2012) La Cargada de Funcionarios en Twitter a Favor de 
#reformaenergética, http://aristeguinoticias.com/2609/mexico/la-cargada-de-funcionarios-en-
tw itter-a-favor-de-reformaenergetica/ (accessed 7 October 2015) 
Andión Gamboa, M. (2013) ‘Las Redes Sociales Virtuales como Medios Alternativos al 
Poder de la Telecracia en México’, Versión 31:42 55 
Boyd, D. and Craw ford, K. (2012) ‘Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a 
Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon’, Information, Communication and 
Society, 15.5:662 679 
Couldry, N. (2010) Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism, Los Angeles, 
Sage  
Couldry, N. and Pow ell, A. (2014) ‘Big Data from the Bottom Up,’ Big Data and Society 1. 2:, 
2053951714539277 
 
Craw ford, K., Gray, M.L. and Miltner, K. (eds) (2014) ‘Big Data, Big Questions’, special 
section in the International Journal of Communication 8, 
http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/issue/view /10 (accessed 7 October 2015) 
Davies, T. and Baw a, Z. (2012) ‘The Promises and Perils of Open Government Data (OGD)’, 
The Journal of Community Informatics, http://ci-
journal.net/index.php/ciej/article/view /929/926 (accessed 7 October 2015) 
Dean, J. (2005) ‘Communicative Capitalism: Circulation and the Foreclosure of Politics’, 
Cultural Politics 1.1:51 74  
Espino Sánchez, G. 2012. ¿Cyberrevolución en la política? Mitos y verdades sobre la 
ciberpolitica 2.0 en México. México, DF: Distribuciones Fontamara. 
 
Figueiras, L. (2012) ‘El Movimiento Estudiantil en el Proceso Electoral 2012’, in Figueiras, L. 
(ed.) Del 131 al #YoSoy132. Elección 2012. México: Comunicación y Política Editores 
Ferrara E., Varol O., Davis, C., Mensczer, F. and Flammini, A. (2015) ‘The Rise of Social 
Bots’, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/0000000.0000000 
Fuchs, C. (2014) Social Media: A Critical Introduction, London: Sage 
Gallow ay, R.A. and Thacker, E. (2007) The Exploit, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 
Hallinan, B. and Striphas, T. (2014) ‘Recommended for You: The Netflix Prize and the 
Production of Algorithmic Culture’, New Media and Society: 1461444814538646. 
Huerta-Wong, J. E. and Gómez García, R. 2013. ‘Concentración y Diversidad de los Medios 
de Comunicación y las Telecomunicaciones en México’, Comunicación y Sociedad 19:113 
52 
Islas, O. (2015) ‘Los Neoectivistas: el Recurso contra la Participación Ciudadana’, 
http://w ww.etcetera.com.mx/articulo/los_neoectivistas_el_recurso_contra_la_participacion_c
iudadana./35375/ (accessed 7 October 2015) 
 
Islas, O. and Arribas, A. (2012) ‘Enseñanza y Ejemplo de la Primavera Mexicana’, Razón y 
Palabra 17.80  
McGee, R. (2014) Making All Voices Count: Government Responsiveness. Making All 
Voices Count think piece,  
http://goo.gl/q3A82dhttp://w ww.makingallvoicescount.org/assets/MAVC_GOVERNMENT_R
ESPONSIVENESS.pdf 
Milan, S. (2015) ‘When Algorithms Shape Collective Action: Social Media and the Dynamics 
of Cloud Protesting’, Social Media and Society 18.8: 887 900 
Morozov E. (2013) To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism. 
Philadelphia, PA: Public Affairs 
Mosco, V. (2014) To the Cloud: Big Data in a Turbulent World, New  York: Paradigm 
Commented [A1]: This link doesn’t work. Rosie, Duncan 
– is this still in the public domain or is it internal? 
 
The new one I prov ide is working.  
 
 
Orcutt, M. (2012) ‘Tw itter Mischief Plagues Mexican Election’, MIT Technology Review , 
http://w w w .technologyreview .com/new s/428286/tw itter-mischief-plagues-mexicos-election/ 
(accessed 7 October 2015) 
Ricaurte Quijano, P. (2013) ‘Tan Cerca de Tw itter y tan Lejos de Los Votantes: las 
Estrategias de los Candidatos Presidenciales Mexicanos durante la Campaña Electoral de 
2012’, Versión 31:118 132 
Trejo Delarbre, R. (2004) Poderes Salvajes. Mediocracia sin Contrapesos. México, DF: Cal 
y Arena 
Treré, E. and Barassi, V . (2015) ‘Net-authoritarianism? How  Web Ideologies Reinforce 
Political Hierarchies in the Italian 5 Star Movement’, Journal of Italian Cinema and Media 
Studies 3.3: 287 304, doi: 10.1386/ jicms.3.3.287_1 
Treré, E. and Barranquero, A. (2013) ‘De Mitos y Sublimes Digitales: Movimientos Sociales 
y Tecnologías de la Comunicación desde una Perspectiva Histórica’, Revista de Estudios 
para el Desarrollo Social de la Comunicación 8: 27 47 
Tuckman, J. (2012) ‘Mexican Media Scandal: Secretive Televisa Unit Promoted PRI 
Candidate’, The Guardian, 26 June 
Tufekci, Z. (2014) ‘Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance and Computational 
Politics. First Monday 19.7. doi: 10.5210/fm.v19i7.4901 
Verkamp, J-P. and Gupta, M. (2013) ‘Five Incidents, One Theme: Tw itter Spam as a 
Weapon to Drow n Voices of Protest’, unpublished presentation from 3rd USENIX Workshop 
on Free and Open Communications on the Internet, Berkeley, Califoria 
 
Villamil, J. (2010) El Sexenio de Televisa: Conjuras del Poder Mediático. México, DF: 
Grijalbo 
 
Yu, H. and Robinson, D. (2012) ‘The New  Ambiguity of Open Government’, UCLA Law 
Review Discourse 178, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012489 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2012489 (accessed 7 October 2015) 
  
                                                 
i Making All Voices Count is supported by DFID, USAID, Sida and Omidyar Network 
ii https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mcy5uT4TygA  
iii http://mexico.cnn.com/nacional/2012/05/18/quienes-son-los-ectivistas-y-por-que-apoyan-a-pena-nieto  
                                                                                                                                                        
iv http://www.sinembargo.mx/09-05-2012/228938 
v A ‘social bot’ refers to a ‘computer algorithm that automatically produces content and interacts with humans 
on social media, trying to emulate and possibly alter their behavior’ (Ferrara et al. 2014: 1-2). Some are benign, 
but many designed the purpose of harmfully manipulating social media discourse, for instance by artificially 
inflating the support of a candidate during the elections.   
vi In Spanish, http://www.animalpolitico.com/blogueros-blog-invitado/2011/11/23/haz-patria-caza-un-
bot/#axzz2pexR2Ru3; in English: http://thisisfusion.tumblr.com/post/22718557022/twittergate-mexico-pri-
twitter-scandal  
vii http://www.sinembargo.mx/opinion/07-01-2014/20465 
viii See the following websites for a detailed list of cases where bots were systematically deployed in the 
Mexican context in the last few years: http://www.sinembargo.mx/opinion/07-01-2014/20465; 
http://loquesigue.tv/ 
ix The expression techno-authoritarianism has been adopted in other contexts to refer broadly to uses of digital 
technologies that reinforce hierarchies, and leadership while pretending to enhance participatory democracy 
(Treré and Barassi 2015).  
x http://revolution-news.com/ 
xi http://revolution-news.com/mexico-bot-campaign-of-death-threats-against-blogger-rossana-reguillo/ 
xii See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P7XbocXsFkI 
xiii Research interview with Laura, 11 April 2013.  
xivhttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nj2HipB5a1c&list=UUg-S9Qre98WT9kDEb4hixKw and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UmuFHcyHSaA 
xv http://contralinea.info/archivo-revista/index.php/2013/09/08/yosoy-infiltrado/. These findngs were 
anticipated by articles on the critical blog SinEmbargo and by  the magazine Proceso, and further analysed  on the 
Revolución  3.0 blog. 
